



**FEMA**

NOV 22 2010

Mr. Elmo E. Collins, Jr.  
Regional Administrator  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 400  
Arlington, Texas 76011-8064

Dear Mr. Collins:

I am forwarding a copy of the Final Report for the Biennial Plume Phase Exercise held in San Luis Obispo County on August 11, 2010, for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The purpose of this exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. The final exercise report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IX Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff.

Based on the evaluation of the August 11, 2010, Plume Phase Exercise, the off-site radiological emergency response plans for the state of California and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to DCPP can be implemented, and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at DCPP.

Therefore, the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44 Part 350 interim approval of the off-site radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the state of California, site-specific to DCPP, will remain in effect.

I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the many individuals that participated in this successful exercise. Their dedication to this program was clearly evident.

Mr. Elmo E. Collins, Jr.  
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If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me at (510) 627-7100. Your staff may also contact Mr. Harry Sherwood, Radiological Assistance Committee Chair, at (510) 627-7240.

Sincerely,

  
Nancy Ward  
Regional Administrator  
FEMA Region IX

Enclosure

cc: NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Vanessa Quinn, Chief  
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch  
FEMA Headquarters



Diablo Canyon Power Plant  
**After Action Report**

Exercise Date – August 11, 2010

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



**FEMA**

*Published November 17, 2010*

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## Diablo Canyon Power Plant

# After Action Report

*Published November 17, 2010*

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Preparedness Division - Technological Hazards Branch in Region IX evaluated an off-site biennial Plume Phase exercise on August 11, 2010 in the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). Out-of-sequence interviews were conducted on August 12, 26, and September 29, 2010. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in response to a radiological emergency at DCPP. This drill was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the implementation of state and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures.

The previous biennial exercise at DCPP was conducted on October 29, 2008. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on August 19, 1981.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the exercise. The organizations except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no deficiencies or Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified during this exercise. No ARCAs remain uncorrected from previous exercise.

# SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

## 1.1 Exercise Details

**Exercise Name**

Diablo Canyon Power Plant Biennial Exercise

**Type of Exercise**

Plume Phase Exercise

**Exercise Date**

August 11, 2010

**Program**

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

**Scenario Type**

Radiological Emergency

## 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

Tracey Vardas

Emergency Planning Coordinator

PG&E Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Avila Beach, CA 93424

Kelly Van Buren

Emergency Services Coordinator

San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services

San Luis Obispo, CA 93408

Richard Echavarria  
Senior Site Specialist  
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program  
FEMA Region IX  
Oakland, CA 94607

## 1.3 Participating Organizations

The following agencies and organizations participated in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant exercise:

### State Jurisdictions

- California Emergency Management Agency
- California Department of Public Health
- California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
- California Department of Transportation
- California Highway Patrol
- State Department of Parks and Recreation

### Risk Jurisdictions

- City of Pismo Beach
- City of Pismo Beach Police Department
- City of Pismo Beach Public Works Department
- City of Pismo Beach Fire Station #63
- San Luis Obispo County Air Pollution Control District
- San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors
- San Luis Obispo County Environmental Health
- San Luis Obispo County Department of Social Services
- San Luis Obispo County General Services Department
- San Luis Obispo County Public Health Agency
- San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services
- San Luis Obispo County Office of Education
- San Luis Obispo County Public Works and Transportation
- San Luis Obispo County Information Technology Department
- San Luis Obispo County Department of Agriculture/Weights and Measures
- San Luis Obispo County Counsel
- San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department
- San Luis Obispo County Administrator
- San Luis Coastal Unified School District
- Port San Luis Harbor District

**Private Organizations**

Amateur Radio Emergency Service/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services

American Red Cross – San Luis Obispo County Chapter

KVEC 920 AM Radio Station

Pacific Gas & Electric Diablo Canyon Power Plant

**Federal Jurisdictions**

National Weather Service

## **SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY**

### **2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design**

FEMA Region IX evaluated the exercise on August 11, 2010 to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving DCP. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the Off-site Response Organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency.

### **2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities**

The exercise evaluation area criteria, contained in the FEMA Federal Register Notice, "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology," dated August 25, 2002 represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

The objectives of this exercise are as follows:

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654: A.4, D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654: A.1.d, A.2.a, b)

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654: F.1, 2)

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654: H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e; J.11; K.3.a)

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654: J.10.e, f; K.4)

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and off-site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654: I.8, 10; Supplement 3)

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654: J.9; J.10.f, m)

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NUREG-0654: J.9; J.10.d, e)

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654: K.3.a, b)

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654: J.10.e)

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective action. (NUREG-0654: J.10.c, d, g)

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654: J.10.c, d, g)

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654: J.10.g, j)

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654: J.10.k)

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654: H.10; I.7, 8, 9).

Criterion 4.a.2: Field monitoring teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654: I.8, 11; J.10.a; H.12).

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654: I.9)

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D & NUREG-0654: E.5, 6, 7)

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654: E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654: E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.c)

## 2.3 Scenario Summary

This section contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by the OROs during the DCPD biennial exercise on August 11, 2010, submitted to FEMA by the state of California and DCPD.

An air compressor breaks apart causing parts to fly about the room and oil to splatter, resulting in a fire in an emergency diesel generator room. The control room receives a fire alarm and a fire suppression Cardox system actuation alarm. The fire is not immediately suppressed by the Cardox actuation because the West doors do not close as designed. Since the fire impacts safety related equipment in a vital area, the shift manager declares an Alert Emergency Level Classification (ECL). DCPD initiates notifications to the San Luis Obispo County Watch Commander and the California Emergency Management Agency of the Alert ECL.

Approximately forty minutes later, a high stator temperature on Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-3 causes the pump to trip. The related Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-3 suffers a locked rotor failure that results in a reactor trip signal. The automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor. As a result, the reactor fuel is significantly damaged, justifying a Site Area Emergency (SAE) ECL. A weld in RCP 1-3 fails, resulting in a reactor coolant system leak rate greater than the available makeup capacity. Increased radiation levels detected by the containment high range radiation monitors indicate a potential loss of the containment barrier. The General Emergency ECL is met with the loss of any two barriers and loss or potential loss of a third barrier.

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## SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

### 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the August 11, 2010 biennial Plume Phase exercise to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of state and local governments in the EPZ surrounding DCP. Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the August 2002, Interim REP Program Manual. Detailed information on the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise is found in Appendix C of this report.

### 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix illustrated in Table 3.1, presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed

A - ARCAs assessed or unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Appendix D, extent-of-play agreement)

Presented below are definitions of the terms used in this section relative to criteria demonstration status.

- Met – Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.
- Deficiency – Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more Deficiencies were assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.
- Area Requiring Corrective Action – Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the

recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the biennial exercise.

- Not Demonstrated – Listing of the exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled to be demonstrated during this exercise, but were not demonstrated and the reason they were not demonstrated.
- Prior Issue – Resolved – Descriptions of issues assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.
- Prior Issue – Unresolved – Descriptions of issues assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this exercise. Included are the reasons the issues remain unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are classifications of the three types of issues that are discussed in this report:

A Deficiency is defined in the FEMA Interim REP Program Manual, August 2002 as “...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant.”

An ARCA is defined in the FEMA Interim REP Program Manual, August 2002 as “...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.”

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering issues. This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

- Plant Site Identifier – A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.
- Exercise Year – The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.
- Evaluation Area Criterion – A letter and number corresponding to the criteria in the FEMA REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology.

Issue Classification Identifier – (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA)

- Exercise Issue Identification Number – A separate two digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

Table 3.1 – Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2010-08-11 SITE: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA  A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated								
		CHP Field Ops Interview	CALTRANS Field Ops Interview	CHADOC	COEDOC	County Public Works Field Ops Interview	PWDOC	County Sheriff 's Field Ops Interview
<b>Emergency Operations Management</b>								
Mobilization	1a1			M	M		M	
Facilities	1b1							
Direction and Control	1c1			M	M		M	
Communications Equipment	1d1			M	M		M	
Equipment and Supplies to support operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
<b>Protective Action Decision Making</b>								
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1							
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1							
Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs	2b2							
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1							
Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1							
Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning Relocation, Reentry and Return	2e1							
<b>Protective Action Implementation</b>								
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1	M	M			M	M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1	M	M			M	M	M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1			M			M	
Implementation of protective actions for schools	3c2				M			
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1	M	M			M	M	M
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2	M	M			M	M	M
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1							
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2							
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1							
<b>Field Measurement and Analysis</b>								
Adequate equipment for plume phase field measurements	4a1							
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2							
Field Teams manage sample collection appropriately	4a3							
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1							
Laboratory operations	4c1							
<b>Emergency Notification and Public Info</b>								
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1							
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2							
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception Areas	5a3	M						M
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1							
<b>Support Operations/Facilities</b>								
Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees	6a1							
Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment	6b1							
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1							
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1							

Table 3.1 – Summary of Exercise Evaluation (continued)

DATE: 2010-08-11 SITE: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA  A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated		EAS Radio Station	Joint Information Center	OEL	FMT Alpha	FMT Bravo	PSLHD	San Luis Obispo County EOC
Emergency Operations Management								
Mobilization	1a1		M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1							
Direction and Control	1c1		M	M	M	M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to support operations	1e1		M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making								
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1							M
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1							M
Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs	2b2							M
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1							M
Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1							
Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning relocation, re-entry, and return	2e1							
Protective Action Implementation								
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1			M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1			M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1							M
Implementation of protective actions for schools	3c2							M
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1						M	M
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2							M
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1							
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2							
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1							
Field Measurement and Analysis								
Adequate equipment for plume phase field measurements	4a1				M	M		
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2				M	M		
Field Teams manage sample collection appropriately	4a3			M	M	M		
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1							
Laboratory operations	4c1							
Emergency Notification and Public Info								
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1	M						
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2							
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception Areas	5a3						M	M
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1	M	M					
Support Operations/Facilities								
Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees	6a1							
Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment	6b1							
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1							
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1							

**Table 3.1 – Summary of Exercise Evaluation (continued)**

DATE: 2010-08-11 SITE: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA  A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, M: Met, N: Not Demonstrated		Phone Assistance Center	State Parks Field Ops Interview	UDAC	PBEOC	Fire Station #15	PBFO	SLCUSD
Emergency Operations Management								
Mobilization	1a1	M		M	M	M		
Facilities	1b1							
Direction and Control	1c1	M		M	M	M		
Communications Equipment	1d1	M		M	M	M		
Equipment and Supplies to support operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making								
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1			M				
Radiological Assessment and PARs	2b1			M				
Decisions for the Plume Phase -PADs	2b2							
PADs for protection of special populations	2c1							M
Rad Assessment and Decision making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1							
Rad Assessment and Decision making concerning relocation, re-entry, and return	2e1							
Protective Action Implementation								
Implementation of emergency worker exposure control	3a1		M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI decision	3b1		M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of protective actions for special populations - EOCs	3c1				M	M		
Implementation of protective actions for schools	3c2							M
Implementation of traffic and access control	3d1		M		M	M	M	
Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved	3d2		M		M		M	
Implementation of ingestion pathway decisions - availability/use of info	3e1							
Materials for Ingestion Pathway PADs are available	3e2							
Implementation of relocation, re-entry, and return decisions	3f1							
Field Measurement and Analysis								
Adequate equipment for plume phase field measurements	4a1							
Field Teams obtain sufficient information	4a2			M				
Field Teams manage sample collection appropriately	4a3							
Post plume phase field measurements and sampling	4b1							
Laboratory operations	4c1							
Emergency Notification and Public Info								
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system	5a1							
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Fast Breaker	5a2							
Activation of the prompt alert and notification system - Exception Areas	5a3		M		M	M	M	
Emergency information and instructions for the public and the media	5b1	M						
Support Operations/Facilities								
Mon / decon of evacuees and emergency workers, and registration of evacuees	6a1							
Mon / decon of emergency worker equipment	6b1							
Temporary care of evacuees	6c1							
Transportation and treatment of contaminated injured individuals	6d1							

### **3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries**

#### **3.3.1 California Jurisdictions**

##### **3.3.1.1 CHP Field Operations Interview**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

##### **3.3.1.2 CALTRANS Field Operations Interview**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

##### **3.3.1.3 State Parks Field Operations Interview**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

#### **3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions**

##### **3.3.2.1 County Health Agency Department Operations Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.c.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.2 County Office of Education Department Operations Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.c.2
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.3 County Public Works (Field Operations Interview)**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.4 County Public Works Department Operations Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.5 County Sheriff (Field Operations Interview)**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.2.6 Joint Information Center

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.2.7 Off-site Emergency Laboratory

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.2.8 Off-site Field Monitoring Team Alpha

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: 4.a.3

ISSUE NO.: 19-08-4a3-P-1

ISSUE: The Field Monitoring Procedures do not require ambient radiation measurements before and after an air sample is taken to ensure that the plume has not shifted away from the sampling location or had not changed significantly in strength during the collection of the air sample.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: At the designated time, the air sampler was stopped. An ambient radiation reading was taken to determine if the plume had shifted during the sampling time. Procedure III.06 HP-3, Checklist 5 has been revised, and now instructs the FMTs to “measure post air sample general area dose rates with the ASP-1 (open and closed window).”

ISSUE NO.: 19-08-4a3-P-2

ISSUE: The Field Monitoring Procedure, III.06 HP-3 Checklist 5, gives no guidance for contamination control while handling samples. Air particulate filters and charcoal canisters may become contaminated during handling while being prepared for field counting and transfer to the OEL.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: A muslin cloth was placed on the ground and the counting jig was placed on the cloth to provide a clean work area. Gloves were donned to prevent any spread of contamination. The particulate filter was removed from the envelope with tweezers and placed on the mesh within the jig. The Eberline E-140 with attached pancake probe was used to count the particulate filter. The net counts were at background. The filter was removed from the jig with the tweezers and returned to the sample envelope. After counting the filter, the cartridge was removed from the labeled bag and the same process was repeated with the cartridge being inserted into the jig below the mesh. The net count was again at background.

ISSUE NO.: 19-08-4a3-P-3

ISSUE: The FMTs use charcoal cartridges for the collection of radioiodine. SOP III.06 HP-3, Checklist 5 indicates that a TEDA impregnated activated charcoal cartridge is used for the collection of radioiodine. The FMT's equipment and supply kits had 20 charcoal cartridges for this task. Once a sample was collected, the cartridge was counted using an Eberline E-140 N count rate meter with an HP-210 pancake probe. This practice is not consistent with industry standards and will result in overestimating the quantity of radioiodine present.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The FMTs are now equipped with two tubes of ten Radioiodine Sampler Model GY-130 Silver Zeolite cartridges with an expiration date of July 2019. A tube of ten TEDA impregnated charcoal cartridges are also provided for exercise and drill purposes. SOP III.06 HP-3 was also revised to indicate that silver zeolite cartridges will be used to collect air samples for real events.

f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.9 Off-site Field Monitoring Team Bravo**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.1, 4.a.2, 4.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: 1.e.1

ISSUE NO.: 19-08-1e1-P-5

ISSUE: Emergency workers were each issued a package of KI. Each contained a blister pack with fourteen tablets of 130 mg of KI. They either had an expiration date of March 2007, or March 2008 printed on each of the blister packs. A letter from the Department of Health and Human Services was mentioned, and was later made available which was interpreted as extending the expiration date, though the letter was confusing as it did not specifically address a manufacturer or product lot number.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: All KI packages have been replaced in the Emergency Worker Exposure Control (EWEC) kits at all evaluated locations, and now have an expiration date of April 2016. In August 2009, the San Luis Obispo County Public Health Department also sent out a mailer informing all members of the public who reside or work within the EPZ that the KI tablets distributed in 2003 would be expiring. A voucher was attached to the mailer, listing pre-distribution locations to allow for members of the public to receive KI tablets.

- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.10 Port San Luis Harbor District**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.11 San Luis Coastal Unified School District**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2

- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.12 San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operations Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.13 San Luis Obispo County Phone Assistance Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.14 Unified Dose Assessment Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.15 City of Pismo Beach Emergency Operations Center**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None

- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.16 County Fire Station #15**

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: 5.a.3

ISSUE NO.: 19-08-5a3-A-03

ISSUE: Back-up route alerting was evaluated through discussion. Siren 0601 was simulated as failed. No route alerting map or siren coverage map was available at the Pismo Beach Fire Station and Pismo Beach EOC.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: SOP III.64, Route Alerting, Carless Collection Points and Special Needs Checks for Field Personnel has been created and provided to all fire stations and sheriff substations. During the evaluation at Station #15, it was verified these maps were available through discussion and review of the procedure.

- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.17 City of Pismo Beach Public Works, Police & Fire Departments Field Operations Interview**

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.3
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.3 Private Organizations**

#### **3.3.3.1 Emergency Alert System Radio Station**

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- e. PRIOR ISSUES – RESOLVED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES – UNRESOLVED: None

## SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

A biennial exercise was conducted on August 11, 2010 to assess the capabilities of state and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving DCP. The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the OROs during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region IX Regional Assistance Committee Chairperson and approved by the Regional Administrator.

No deficiencies and no ARCAs were identified during this exercise for the state of California or San Luis Obispo County.

Based on the evaluation of the August 11, 2010 biennial exercise and subsequent out-of-sequence interviews, the off-site radiological emergency response plans for the state of California and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to DCP can be implemented, and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at DCP.

## APPENDIX A: DRILL EVALUATORS

DATE:2010-08-11, SITE: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operations Center	Gary Bolender**	ICF
	Lou Sosler	ICF
	Edward Golinski	FEMA Region V
	William Maier	NRC Region IV
	Patricia Foster	FEMA Region I
	John Woytak	FEMA Region IX
Unified Dose Assessment Center	Daryl Thome**	ICF
	Nan Calhoun	FEMA Region VI
Joint Information Center	Henry Christiansen**	ICF
	Elena Joyner	FEMA Region IX
Phone Assistance Center	Paul Anderson	FEMA Region IX
Public Works Department Operations Center	John Rice	FEMA Region I
County Health Agency Operations Center	Ed Snyder	EPA Region IX
County Office of Education Operations Center	Rebecca Fontenot	FEMA HQ
County Fire Department	Jay Kinsley	FEMA Region V
City of Pismo Beach Emergency Operations Center	James McClanahan**	ICF
	Alonzo McSwain	FEMA HQ
Port San Luis Harbor District	Roy Smith	ICF
Field Monitoring Team Alpha	Johanna Berkey	FEMA Region X
Field Monitoring Team Bravo	Dave Stuenkel	ICF
Field Monitoring Team Charlie	Richard Grundstrom	ICF
Offsite Environmental Laboratory	Alan Bevan	ICF
CHP Field Operations Interview	Alan Bevan	ICF
CALTRANS Field Operations Interview	Alan Bevan	ICF
State Parks Field Operations Interview	Richard Grundstrom	ICF
City of Pismo Beach Public Works, Police & Fire Departments Field Operations Interview	James McClanahan	ICF
	Alonzo McSwain	FEMA HQ
County Sheriff's Department Interview	Lou Sosler	ICF
County Public Works Department Interview	John Rice	FEMA Region I
EAS Radio Station KVEC	William Maier	NRC Region IV
	Paul Anderson	FEMA Region IX
San Luis Coastal Unified School District	Richard Echavarria	FEMA Region IX
	Katherine Nishihara	FEMA Region IX
**Team Leader		

Katherine Nishihara, Site-Specialist

Richard Echavarria, Senior Site-Specialist

Harry Sherwood, RAC Chair

## APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Meaning
ARCA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
CALTRANS	California Department of Transportation
CHADOC	County Health Agency Department Operations Center
CHO	County Health Officer
CHP	California Highway Patrol
COE	County Office of Education
COEDOC	County Office of Education Department Operations Center
DCPP	Diablo Canyon Power Plant
ECC	Emergency Communications Center
ECL	Emergency Level Classification
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
EWEC	Emergency Worker Exposure Control
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMT	Field Monitoring Team
KI	Potassium Iodide
OEL	Off-site Environmental Laboratory
ORO	Off-site Response Organization
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PAZ	Protective Action Zone
PBEOC	Pismo Beach Emergency Operations Center
PBFO	Pismo Beach Police, Fire, Public Works Department Field Operations
PG&E	Pacific Gas & Electric
PSLHD	Port San Luis Harbor District
PWDOC	Public Works Department Operations Center
RCP	Reactor Coolant Pump
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plans
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SLCUSD	San Luis Coastal Unified School District
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TEDA	Triethylene di-amine
UDAC	Unified Dose Assessment Center

## **APPENDIX C: EXTENT-OF-PLAY**

The summary presented in this appendix is a compilation of exercise scenario materials submitted by the state of California and DCPD. This appendix contains the extent-of-play agreement prepared by the state of California and approved by FEMA Region IX to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the evaluation area criteria.

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**STATE OF CALIFORNIA and  
SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY/CITIES**



**EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT  
May 11, 2010**

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**For the August 11, 2010 Diablo Canyon Power Plant**

**EVALUATED EXERCISE**

STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
EXTENT OF PLAY  
Diablo Canyon Power Plant

EVALUATED EXERCISE

August 11, 2010

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
EXTENT OF PLAY  
Diablo Canyon Power Plant

EVALUATED EXERCISE

August 11, 2010

**Acronyms**

ARCA .....	Area Requiring Corrective Action
Caltrans .....	California Department of Transportation
CalEMA .....	California Emergency Management Agency
CDPH .....	California Department of Public Health
CHP .....	California Highway Patrol
COE .....	San Luis Obispo County Office of Education
County OES .....	San Luis Obispo County OES
CSWC .....	Calif. State Warning Center
DCPP .....	Diablo Canyon Power Plant
DOC .....	Department Operations Center
EAS .....	Emergency Alert System
EOC .....	San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operations Center
EOP .....	Extent of Play Agreement
EPZ .....	Emergency Planning Zone
EWEC .....	Emergency Worker Exposure Control
FEMA .....	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMT .....	Field Monitoring Team
JIC .....	Joint Information Center
KI .....	Potassium Iodide
NRC .....	Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PAD .....	Protective Action Decision
PAR .....	Protective Action Recommendation
PIO .....	Public Information Officer
RACES .....	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
REOC .....	State OES Region Emergency Operation Center
SDAC .....	State Dose Assessment Center
SOC .....	State Operations Center
State NPP Plan .....	State of California Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan
UDAC .....	Unified Dose Assessment Center

## **1. PURPOSE, SCOPE & GENERAL CONCEPTS**

This extent-of-play agreement addresses participation by State of California agencies and local jurisdictions in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) evaluated-exercise scheduled for August 11, 2010. In order to show continuity among participating agencies, this agreement includes the extent of play by:

- State of California agencies, including the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) and the California Department of Public Health (CDPH).
- Locally-based State of California agencies, including Calif. Highway Patrol (CHP), Calif. State Parks, and Calif. Dept. of Transportation (Caltrans).
- Local agencies and jurisdictions, including the County of San Luis Obispo (SLO Co.) and participating Departments and Agencies and Cities within the County.

The purpose of this extent-of-play agreement is to present the evaluation areas that will be demonstrated and to identify planned deviations from the implementation of the applicable plans, including the State of California Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan (State NPP Plan, 2008), the CDPH Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Procedures (which are a part of the State NPP Plan), and San Luis Obispo County Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plans and Procedures. The state and local agencies will implement applicable elements in these plans and procedures unless otherwise specified in this agreement.

The goal of the state participation in the exercise is to support local governments in their effort to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the public can be protected during a nuclear power plant emergency. The goal of local agencies and organizations is to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the public can be protected during a nuclear power plant emergency.

Throughout the exercise, real emergencies take priority over exercise play.

The demonstration or exercise phase will terminate when the FEMA lead evaluator and lead exercise controller agree that all required evaluation criteria have been adequately demonstrated and evaluated.

## **2. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES**

The purpose of the exercise is to comply with the requirements of 44 CFR 350 and the guidelines of NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1. Exercise planners utilized the elements described in the 67 FR 20580 (April 25, 2002) and Interim Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual (August 2002), to develop the extent of play.

### **3. RE-DEMONSTRATION AND IN-PLAY INTERVIEWS**

Areas requiring corrective action may be immediately corrected and re-evaluated during the exercise or immediately following, providing that the re-demonstration is not disruptive, does not interrupt the flow of the exercise, and does not affect other evaluation areas. During demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence, the Evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate training prior to the re-demonstration may be allowed, again provided that the training and re-demonstration are not disruptive, do not interrupt the flow of the exercise, and do not affect other evaluation areas. If the re-demonstration is performed correctly, the Evaluator will document the issue of concern, with a statement that the issue was corrected during the exercise. If the demonstration is still performed unsuccessfully, the issue will be documented and referred to the RAC Chair to determine the appropriate classification of the issue.

Evaluation areas that are not demonstrated due to scenario play may be done through interview during or immediately following the exercise. An evaluator may interview players to determine sequence of events or actions that would have been taken if the scenario had been different. Evaluator interview of players should not be disruptive nor interrupt flow of the exercise.

### **4. OUTSTANDING ISSUES**

The last FEMA-evaluated plume-phase exercise at Diablo Canyon Power Plant was held on October 29, 2008. There were no deficiencies and three Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified during the exercise. Two ARCAs were corrected during the exercise. ARCA 19-08-5a3-A-03 will be resolved on August 11, 2010 upon receipt of updated siren coverage and route alerting maps pre-deployed to fire stations in the EPZ.

### **5. EXTENT OF PLAY**

#### **5.1 Overview of Extent of Play**

The following Extent of Play (EOP) has been developed with state and local jurisdictions involved in the planning and response to Diablo Canyon Power Plant emergencies. This EOP represents the level of participation and any limitations on the demonstration of Emergency Preparedness Evaluation Area Elements by the participating agencies and organizations. The Emergency Preparedness Evaluation Areas – the elements and sub-elements – for this exercise are those that are required to be demonstrated in every exercise, as required by the *Interim REP Program Manual (August 2002)*.<sup>1</sup> Copies of applicable plans and procedures have been provided to FEMA, Region IX staff.

#### **5.2 NRC Participation**

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV will not participate in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant exercise during the 2010 evaluated exercise.

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<sup>1</sup> See Table 4 – Federal Evaluation Process Matrix for minimum frequency of specific evaluation areas and sub-elements. See also 67 FR 20602, Table 2 (April 25, 2002).

### **5.3 Evaluation Criteria**

Table 1 shows the emergency Preparedness Elements that are required to be demonstrated in the August 11, 2010 Diablo Canyon Power Plant exercise, along with the level of demonstration that will be displayed in the exercise (i.e., fully demonstrated, limited demonstration, simulated, out-of-sequence interviews, not demonstrated, or courtesy evaluation only). Each deviation from full demonstration is described in this EOP agreement.

Table 1 includes all offsite state and local agencies and organizations that will participate in the exercise. Following Table 1, specific information about limitations on extent of play and demonstration of exercise criteria is presented. In general, any portions of the exercise evaluation areas to be demonstrated that require interaction with the general public will be simulated.

EVALUATED ORGANIZATION	TABLE 1 OVERVIEW OF EXTENT OF PLAY – STATE & LOCAL AGENCIES																				
	Emergency Operations Management					Protective Action Decision-Making					Protective Action Implementation					Field Measurement and Analysis			Emergency Notif & Public Information		
EOC	D		D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D				D	D	D
UDAC	D		D	D	D	D	D			D	D							D			
FMTs	D		D	D	D					D	D					D	D	D			
JIC	D		D	D	D																D
Phone Assistance Center	D		D	D	D																D
Public Works Dept. DOC	D		D	D	D					D	D	D		D	D						
Health Agency DOC	D		D	D	D							D									
County Office of Education DOC	D		D	D	D								D								
County Fire Station 15 (Los Osos)	D		D	D	D					D	D	D		D						D	
EAS Station (KVEC)				I															I		I
San Luis Coastal Unified School				I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I							I
Port San Luis Harbor District	D		D	D	D					D	D	D		D						D	

TABLE 1 OVERVIEW OF EXTENT OF PLAY – STATE & LOCAL AGENCIES  Codes for Table 1: D.....Element will be fully demonstrated. I.....Element will be demonstrated by interview. L.....Element will be demonstrated with limitations that are described in this BOP. C..... Courtesy evaluation only.	Mobilization																					
	1.a.1	1.b.1	1.c.1	1.d.1	1.e.1	2.a.1	2.b.1	2.b.2	2.c.1	3.a.1	3.b.1	3.c.1	3.c.2	3.d.1	3.d.2	4.a.1	4.a.2	4.a.3	5.a.1	5.a.3	5.b.1	
Offsite Environmental Laboratory	D		D	D	D					D	D							D				
County Sheriff (Field Ops)					I					I	I			I	I						I	
County Public Works (Field Ops)					I					I	I			I	I							
City of Pismo Beach	D		D	D	D				D	D	D	D	D	D	D						D	
City of Pismo Beach Police					I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I						I	
City of Pismo Beach Public Works					I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I						I	
City of Pismo Beach Fire					I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I						I	
<b>*Locally-Based* State Agencies</b>																						
Caltrans (Field Ops)	I				I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I							
CHP (Field Ops)	I				I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I						I	
Calif. State Parks (Field Ops)	I				I				I	I	I	I	I	I	I						I	
<b>State Agencies @ County EOC</b>																						
Cal EMA – Agency Rep	L		D	D	L																	
<b>State Agencies @ UDAC</b>																						
Cal EMA	L		D	D	D																	
Calif. Dept. Public Health	L		D	D	D		D															

TABLE 1 <b>OVERVIEW OF EXTENT OF PLAY – STATE &amp; LOCAL AGENCIES</b>  Codes for Table 1: D.....Element will be fully demonstrated. I.....Element will be demonstrated by interview. L.....Element will be demonstrated with limitations that are described in this EOP. C..... Courtesy evaluation only.	Mobilization																					
	1.a.1	1.b.1	1.c.1	1.d.1	1.e.1	2.a.1	2.b.1	2.b.2	2.c.1	3.a.1	3.b.1	3.c.1	3.c.2	3.d.1	3.d.2	4.a.1	4.a.2	4.a.3	5.a.1	5.a.3	5.b.1	
<b>State Agencies @ JIC</b>																						
Cal EMA	L			D	D																	D
Calif. Dept. Public Health	L			D	D																	D
CHP	L			D	D																	D
Calif. State Parks	L			D	D																	D
<b>State Agencies – OES Southern Region</b>																						
Cal EMA Southern REOC																						

For a more complete description of the exercise evaluation areas and any limitations, see the narrative in the remainder of the EOP document.

#### **5.4. Demonstration of Exercise Criteria – Limitations Described**

##### 5.4.1 Exercise Evaluation Area 1 – Emergency Operations Management

All state agency designated positions will be staffed in accordance with the appropriate procedures.

5.4.1.1 Criterion 1.a.1: Mobilization of Emergency Personnel – Demonstrate the ability to use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654: A.4, D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- Personnel that must travel to participate will be staged at a location near their response facility, and will respond once they have received proper notification. This includes: CDPH staff to the JIC and the UDAC, Cal EMA staff to the EOC/EOF, UDAC, and JIC. The Santa Barbara County representative, National Weather Service staff and state exercise participants will pre-stage and receive notifications through their agencies normal procedure (i.e., pager, telephone, cell phone).
- The Cal EMA Southern Region will provide one staff to the San Luis Obispo County EOC to represent the Southern Region, assist with coordination, communication and intel gathering. Personnel may be staged at a location near their response facility prior to the start of play, and will respond once proper notification has been received.
- The Calif. State Warning Center (CSWC) is a 24-hour a day, seven-day a week facility. Personnel will be at their normally assigned work stations, and they will implement the State NPP Plan notification SOP.
- State personnel responding to the exercise will be notified to be activated by the CSWC using the State NPP Plan notification SOP.
- Participation of the CDPH Department Operations Center (DOC) will be simulated. The CDPH DOC will not be activated or evaluated during this exercise. The primary responsibilities of this facility during the emergency phase are to dispatch CDPH personnel, to establish communications with the JIC, to receive information from staff at the UDAC and JIC, and provide support, if needed. Response to requests from CDPH involved in the exercise will be simulated to facilitate the conduct of the exercise. The simulation player(s) will be located in Sacramento. CDPH personnel participating at the exercise will be pre-staged and CDPH personnel at the UDAC and JIC in San Luis Obispo County will simulate communications by transmitting information to the CDPH DOC, as needed.
- The State Dose Assessment Center will not participate in this exercise as it normally does not become involved until the post-plume, ingestion phase.
- The CDPH Sanitation and Radiation Laboratory will not participate in this exercise as it does not become involved until the post-plume, ingestion phase.

- Setup of COE RACES station facilities is done pre-exercise to facilitate timely ORO demonstration and FEMA evaluation of pertinent exercise criteria.

**5.4.1.2 Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities** – Demonstrate the facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654: H.3)

Outstanding Issues: None

Level of Participation & Limitations – State Facilities: The following state facilities have an identified role in a nuclear power plant incident. Participation and limitations are described below.

<b>Level of Participation &amp; Limitations – State Facilities</b>	
<b>State Facility</b>	<b>Limitations on Play</b>
State Operations Center (SOC) State Office of Emergency Services 3650 Schriever Avenue Mather, CA 95655	The SOC will not be activated or evaluated during this exercise.
Southern Region Emergency Operations Center (Southern REOC) Cal EMA 11200 Lexington Dr., AFRC Bldg 283 Los Alamitos, CA 90720-5005	The Southern REOC will not be activated or evaluated during this exercise.
State of California Joint Information Center 3650 Schriever Avenue Mather, CA 95655	The State Joint Information Center will not be activated or evaluated during this exercise.
Calif. State Warning Center (CSWC) 3650 Schriever Avenue Mather, CA 95655	This facility will conduct State NPP Plan notifications in accordance with the appropriate SOP to facilitate the conduct of the exercise. The CSWC will not be evaluated during this exercise.
California Department of Public Health Operations Center (CDPH DOC) 1615 Capitol Avenue Sacramento, CA 95814	The CDPH DOC will not be activated or evaluated during this exercise.

Level of Participation & Limitations – San Luis Obispo County Facilities: The following San Luis Obispo County facilities have an identified role in a nuclear power plant incident, but their role in this exercise will be limited as described below. County emergency facilities that are not limited as described below will participate as described in the appropriate emergency procedures.

<b>Level of Participation &amp; Limitations – County Facilities</b>	
<b>County Facility</b>	<b>Limitations on Play</b>
County Office of Education (COE) 3350 Education Drive San Luis Obispo, CA 93405	RACES amateur radio operators will set up back-up communications equipment in the COE prior to the exercise. Following active evaluation at the COE, RACES may discontinue operations prior to exercise termination and move personnel to participate in other non-evaluated amateur radio activities.

5.4.1.3 Criterion 1.c.1: Direction and Control – Key personnel with leadership roles demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency operations. (NUREG-0654: A.1.d, A.2.a,b)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations: None

5.4.1.4 Criterion 1.d.1: Communications Equipment – Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654: F.1, 2)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- The Local EAS broadcast system will not be activated for this exercise. An EAS operator will read the messages, and activation of the system will be simulated only.
- An interview with an EAS radio station representative and a station engineer will address communications equipment. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.
- Various RACES volunteers will participate in the exercise and staff a number of facilities providing back-up communications as needed. RACES will also utilize the exercise for training activities that are not a part of the evaluation. RACES personnel may cease non-essential operations at one or more facilities or for purposes of relocation to another facility.

5.4.1.5 Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations – Demonstrate that equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654: H.7, 10; J.10.a,b,e; J.11; K.3.a)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- Representatives of the San Luis Coastal Unified School District, the Los Osos Middle school principal, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff, San Luis Obispo County Public Works, Caltrans, CHP, and Calif. State Parks will be available for out-of-sequence interviews to demonstrate equipment not demonstrated during exercise play. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the inventory will be provided separately.
- San Luis Obispo County coordinated a pre-distribution of potassium iodide to the general public during the fall of 2009. Potassium iodide stockpiles are no longer maintained in the County. Potassium iodide is pre-deployed for emergency workers, and stockpiled for incarcerated populations.

#### 5.4.2 Exercise Evaluation Area 2 – Protective Action Decision Making

5.4.2.1 Criterion 2.a.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control – Demonstrate a relevant decision-making process and coordination to ensure emergency worker exposure control, including the use of KI and provisions to authorize exposure in excess of limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654: J.10.e,f; K.4)

Outstanding Issues: None.

Limitations:

- The ingestion of potassium iodide will be simulated.
- Exercise play will address EWEC/KI decision-making and communication. A CHO interview during play will address emergency workers reaching exposure limits.
- Dose records for offsite emergency workers including field monitoring team members are tracked by the emergency worker and the information relayed to their appropriate agency command center. The command centers will send exposure reports to the EWEC Desk in the San Luis Obispo County EOC. The County Health Officer is advised of off-site dose exposure as specified in plans and procedures. EWEC desk activity will be driven by simulator messages and faxes from participating command centers and the SimCell.

#### 5.4.2.2 Criterion 2.b: Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654: I.8, 10; Supp. 3)

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654: J.9; J.10.f,m)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- Backup manual dose calculations will not be demonstrated unless an actual failure of the primary system and drill feed data occurs.

#### 5.4.2.3 Criterion 2.c: Protective Action Recommendations for Special Populations

Criterion 2.c.1: Demonstrate decision-making necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for special populations (NUREG-0654: J.9; J.10.d, e)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

Representatives of the San Luis Coastal Unified School District and the Los Osos Middle School will demonstrate the decision-making process of protective actions for school populations within that district by an out-of-sequence interview at a date agreed upon. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately. Due to the summer season, interviews with school officials will not take place on August 12.

5.4.3 Exercise Evaluation Area 3 – Protective Action Implementation5.4.3.1 Criterion 3.a.1: Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control –

Demonstrate the capability to issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers. Demonstrate ability to read dosimetry and record readings appropriately. (NUREG-0654: K.3.a,b)

Outstanding Issues: None.

Limitations:

- Out-of-sequence interview: Representatives from CHP, Caltrans, Calif. State Parks, San Luis Obispo County Public Works, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department, City of Pismo Beach Police Dept, Fire Department, and Public Works, San Luis Coastal Unified School District, and the Los Osos Middle School will participate in an out-of-sequence interview to demonstrate knowledge of exposure limits and dosimetry. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.

5.4.3.2 Criterion 3.b.1: Implementation of Potassium Iodide Decision –

Demonstrate the capability and resources to implement potassium iodide (KI) protective actions for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals (not the general public) is maintained. (NUREG-0654: J.10.e)

Outstanding Issues: None.

Limitations:

- Emergency responders working in the jurisdiction will follow the protective action recommendations of that jurisdiction and will simulate taking KI as recommended by the jurisdictions' Health Officer.
- There are no state institutionalized individuals in the 10-mile EPZ. Therefore ingestion of KI by institutionalized persons will not be demonstrated or simulated.
- Out-of-sequence interview: Representatives from CHP, Caltrans, Calif. State Parks, San Luis Obispo County Public Works, City of Pismo Beach Police Dept, Fire Department, and Public Works, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department and San Luis Coastal Unified School District, and the Los Osos Middle School will participate in an out-of-sequence interview to demonstrate knowledge of KI ingestion orders. See Table 2. Specific

information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.

- Ingestion of KI is simulated.
- KI has been pre-distributed to residents in San Luis Obispo County. Therefore, distribution of KI to the general public will not be demonstrated.

#### 5.4.3.3 Criterion 3.c: Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Needs Populations

Criterion 3.c.1: Special Needs Populations Other Than Schools – Demonstrate protective action implementation in impacted areas for special populations other than schools. (NUREG-0654: J.10.c,d,g)

Outstanding Issues: None

##### Limitations:

- San Luis Obispo County Fire Station 15 representative will discuss and demonstrate familiarity with the current special needs list and procedure in an interview during exercise play or out-of-sequence. The special needs list may be reviewed at County Fire Station 15. Individuals on the list will not be contacted.
- San Luis Obispo County Public Works Department Operations Center staff will address the transportation needs of the carless population through the simulated dispatch of buses in coordination with the transit unit leader in the San Luis Obispo County EOC in an interview during exercise play or out-of-sequence. NOTE: The San Luis Obispo County Public Works Department Operations Center supports the transit unit leader on an as needed basis. For out-of sequence interview, see Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.

Criterion 3.c.2: Implementation of Protective Actions for Schools – Demonstrate the capability and resources necessary to implement protective action decisions for schoolchildren within the plume pathway emergency planning zone. (NUREG-0654: J.10.c,d,g)

Outstanding Issues: None

##### Limitations:

- San Luis Coastal Unified School District will participate in an interview which includes a district superintendent, teacher, principal and bus driver or transportation manager, and the Los Osos Middle School Principal. The interview process will demonstrate San Luis Coastal Unified School District familiarity with the process of handling school populations during an emergency at DCPD including the post-emergency phase relocation and return of students in impacted areas. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately. The interview will not take place on August 12, 2010.

- School children will not be loaded onto buses.
- School children will not be moved to relocation areas during this drill.

#### 5.4.3.4 Criterion 3.d: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Criterion 3.d.1: Demonstrate appropriate traffic and access control for evacuated and sheltered areas. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654: J.10.g,j)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- The Port San Luis Harbor District, County Fire Station 15, City of Pismo Beach Police Department, Fire Department, and Public Works, CHP, Caltrans, Calif. State Parks, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff, and San Luis Obispo County Public Works will address evacuation, access control and traffic impediments during the drill and/or during their out-of-sequence interviews. Field activity and play is simulated.
- Actual road blocks, traffic control, and evacuations will not occur.

Criterion 3.d.2: Demonstrate identification and resolution of impediments to evacuation. (NUREG-0654: J.10.k)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- During the out-of-sequence interviews, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Department, San Luis Obispo County Public Works, City of Pismo Beach Police Department, Fire Department, and Public Works, Caltrans, Calif. State Parks and CHP will address the resolution of identified impediments to evacuation during the emergency phase of the exercise. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.

#### 5.4.4 Exercise Evaluation Area 4 – Field Measurement and Analysis

##### 5.4.4.1 Criterion 4.a: Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analysis –

Demonstrate the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. Demonstrate the capability to use field teams within the plume EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to detect radioactive particulates in the airborne plume.

Criterion 4.a.1: Demonstrate that the field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654: H.10; I.7, 8, 9).

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- A Field Team member will demonstrate donning and doffing of protective clothing at a convenient time during the exercise; however protective clothing will not be worn during the exercise.
- Carbon mask filters will be used by San Luis Obispo County for this exercise.

Criterion 4.a.2: Demonstrate field monitoring teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654: I.8, 11; J.10.a; H.12).

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations: None

Criterion 4.a.3: Demonstrate that ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Demonstrate field gathering, analysis and communication of field data in a timely manner using the appropriate SOP. (NUREG-0654: I.9)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- The SimCell function supplies all simulated exercise data.

5.4.5 Exercise Evaluation Area 5 – Emergency Notification and Public Information

5.4.5.1 Criterion 5.a.1 – Activation of the Initial Prompt Alert and Notification

System – Demonstrate that activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D & NUREG-0654: E.5, 6, 7)

Outstanding Issues: None

Limitations:

- During this drill the following activities will be simulated: sounding of sirens, activation of tone alert radios, and delivery of EAS messages to stations.
- Drill play includes use of pre-scripted local EAS messages that will be read but not delivered.
- An interview with one EAS radio station representative and station engineer will address EAS activation, notification, and public information. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.

**5.4.5.2 Criterion 5.a.3 – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System in Exception Areas** – Demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized off-site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654: E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Outstanding Issues: Issue NO.: 19-085a3-A-03

Limitations:

- Backup public alerting procedures will be discussed with representatives from San Luis Obispo County Sheriff in the Operations Room, the Port San Luis Harbor District, and County Fire Station 15 during exercise play. The criterion will be demonstrated during out-of-sequence interviews with representatives from the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff Department, City of Pismo Beach Police Department, City of Pismo Fire Department, CHP, and Calif. State Parks. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.
- Backup alerting will not be field demonstrated.

**5.4.5.3 Criterion 5.b.1 – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and Media** – Demonstrate the capability to provide clear, accurate, and timely emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media. (NUREG-0654: E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4c)

Outstanding Issues: None.

Limitations:

- An interview with one EAS radio station representative and station engineer will address EAS activation, notification, and public information. See Table 2. Specific information about the time, location, and identification of persons participating in the interview will be provided separately.

**5.5. Sub-Elements Not Demonstrated**

The following sub-elements will not be demonstrated in this exercise. These areas will be demonstrated in separate exercises, as stated in the six-year cycle:

2.d.1, 2.e.1, 3.e.1,3.e.2, 3.f.1, 4.b.1, 4.c.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1, 6.c.1, 6.d.1,

**5.6. Interviews and Demonstrations**

Table 2 shows the emergency preparedness elements that will be demonstrated by interview. The interviews and demonstrations may take place during the exercise if it does not interfere with exercise play or during a pre-arranged, out-of-sequence interview. Limitations on the demonstrations and interviews are described in section 5.4 of this document. Specific information about the times, dates, locations, and identification of persons participating in out-of-sequence interviews and demonstrations will be provided to the evaluators before the exercise under separate cover.

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**Table 2** **Schedule for Interviews and Demonstrations**

<b>Evaluation Element</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Time/Date/Location/ Contact Person (Details to be Provided)</b>
1.d.1 – Communications Equipment	Demonstration and evaluation of emergency communications equipment.	EAS Radio Station (KVEC)	August 12
1.e.1 – Equipment & Supplies	Demonstration and evaluation of emergency communications equipment.	San Luis Coastal Unified School District	September 2010 or alternate date as agreed upon by the County and FEMA evaluator
		Los Osos Middle School	
		San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	August 12, a.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Public Works	August 12, a.m.
		Caltrans	August 12, a.m.
		CHP	August 12, a.m.
		Calif. State Parks	August 12, a.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Police	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Public Works	August 12, p.m.
City of Pismo Beach Fire	August 12, p.m.		
2.c.1 – PARs for Special Populations (Schools)	Demonstrate the decision making process of protective actions for school populations.	San Luis Coastal Unified School District	September 2010 or alternate date as agreed upon by the County and FEMA evaluator <sup>2</sup>
		Los Osos Middle School	
3.a.1 – EWEC Exposure Control (Exposure Limits & Dosimetry)	Demonstrate knowledge of exposure limits and dosimetry.	San Luis Coastal Unified School District	September 2010 or alternate date as agreed upon by the County and FEMA evaluator
		Los Osos Middle School	
		San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	August 12, a.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Public Works	August 12, a.m.
		Caltrans	August 12, a.m.
		CHP	August 12, a.m.
		Calif. State Parks	August 12, a.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Police Dept.	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Public Works	August 12, p.m.
City of Pismo Beach Fire Department	August 12, p.m.		

Evaluation Element	Description	Agency	Time/Date/Location/ Contact Person (Details to be Provided)
3.b.1 - Implementation of Potassium Iodide Decision (KI Ingestion)	Demonstrate knowledge of KI ingestion orders.	San Luis Coastal Unified School District	September 2010 or alternate date as agreed upon by the County and FEMA evaluator
		Los Osos Middle School	
		San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	August 12, a.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Public Works	August 12, a.m.
		Caltrans	August 12, a.m.
		CHP	August 12, a.m.
		Calif. State Parks	August 12, a.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Police Dept.	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Public Works	August 12, p.m.
City of Pismo Beach Fire Department	August 12, p.m.		
3.c.1 - Implementation of PADs for Special Populations	Address the transportation needs of the car-less population through the simulated dispatch of buses in coordination with the Transportation Manager in the San Luis Obispo County EOC.	San Luis Obispo County Public Works	August 12, a.m.
3.c.2 - Implementation of PADs for Schools	Demonstrate familiarity with the process of handling school populations during a DCCP event including the post-emergency phase relocation and return of students in impacted areas.	San Luis Coastal Unified School District	September 2010 or alternate date as agreed upon by the County and FEMA evaluator
		Los Osos Middle School	
3.d.1 - Implementation of Traffic & Access Control/Accurate Instructions	Address evacuation, access control and traffic impediments during drill or during interviews scheduled for other evaluation criteria.	Caltrans	August 12, a.m.
		Calif. State Parks	August 12, a.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Public Works	August 12, a.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	August 12, a.m.
		CHP	August 12, a.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Police Dept.	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Public Works	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Fire Department	August 12, p.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	August 12, a.m.
San Luis Obispo County Public Works	August 12, a.m.		
3.d.2 - Identify and Resolve Impediments to Evacuation	Address the resolution of identified impediments to evacuation during emergency phase of the exercise.	Caltrans	August 12, a.m.
		Calif. State Parks	August 12, a.m.
		CHP	August 12, a.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Police Dept.	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Public Works	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Fire Department	August 12, p.m.

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<b>Evaluation Element</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Time/Date/Location/ Contact Person (Details to be Provided)</b>
5.a.1 – Activation of Initial Prompt Alert and Notification	Address EAS activation, notification, and public information.	EAS Radio Station (KVEC)	August 12, a.m.
5.a.3 – Activation of Prompt Alert & Notification System/Exception Areas	Discuss backup public route alerting procedures discussed during exercise or during interviews.	Calif. State Parks	August 12, a.m.
		San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's Dept.	August 12, a.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Police Dept.	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Public Works	August 12, p.m.
		City of Pismo Beach Fire Dept.	August 12, p.m.
		CHP	August 12, a.m.
5.b.1 – Emergency Information and Instructions to the Public and Media	Address emergency information and instructions to the public.	EAS Radio Station	August 12, a.m.

## APPENDIX D: EXERCISE TIMELINE

DATE: 2010-08-11, SITE: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	SLO EOC	PAC	UDAC	PBEOC	Fire Station #15	CHADOC	COEDOC	PWDOC	JIC	OEL	PSLHD
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	0826	0833	0843	0922	0848	0915	0948	0850	0828	0843	0853/0900	0848
Site Area Emergency	1012	1012	1013	1013	1029	1039	1017	1016	1015	1013	1013	1029
General Emergency	1054	1057	1057	1058	1126	1109	1108	1100	1104	1057	1059	1103
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1119	1126	1145	1119	1219	1125	N/A	N/A	1208	1145	1119	1206
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		0925	0951	0928	0925	1051	0858	0912	0938	0951	1103	0852
Declaration of Emergency: County		1027	1027	1052	1042	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1042
Declaration of Emergency: Governor's		1135	1150	N/A	1224	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Plume Phase Terminated		1404	1400	1400	1407	1405	1405	1405	1404	1400	1400	1240
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Avila Beach		1154-1333	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Old Port Beach		0942	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close El Chorro Regional Park and Oceano County Campground		0936-1004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Dairy Creek Golf Course		0936-1045	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Morro Bay Gold Course		0936-1038	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Montana de Oro State Park		0950-1030	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Los Osos Oaks State Reserve		0950-1041	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Morro Bay State Park		1023-1130	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Morro Bay Strand State Beach		1023-1130	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Pismo Beach State Park, North Beach and Oceano State Campground		1023-1120	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close Oceano Dunes State Vehicle Recreational Area		1023-1225	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close City of Pismo Beach City Beaches		N/A	N/A	N/A	1028	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Evacuate Grover Beach Elementary School		1120-1145	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

# APPENDIX D: EXERCISE TIMELINE

DATE: 2010-08-11, SITE: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, CA

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	SLO EOC	PAC	UDAC	PBEOC	Fire Station #15	CHADOC	COEDOC	PWDOC	JIC	OEL	PSLHD
Early Precautionary Actions: Evacuate Camp at Rancho El Chorro, Mesa View Staff and All Non-Essential COE Employees		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1155	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Close PSLHD Avila Beach Drive at San Luis Creek to incoming traffic		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1038
Early Precautionary Actions: Place PSLHD Command Center on Standby at Avila Beach Staging Area		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1105
Early Precautionary Actions: Activate Camp Roberts		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Early Precautionary Actions: Activate Santa Maria Fairgrounds		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1 <sup>st</sup> Protective Action Decision: Evacuate PAZ 1 and 2		1034	N/A	N/A	1057	1039	N/A	1110	N/A	N/A	N/A	1042
1 <sup>st</sup> Siren Activation		1046	1101	N/A	1046	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1101	N/A	1042
1 <sup>st</sup> EAS Message		1047	1043	N/A	1046	N/A	N/A	1109	N/A	1043	N/A	N/A
2 <sup>nd</sup> Protective Action Decision: Evacuate PAZ 1, 2, 4 and 5		1203	1212	N/A	1213	1204	N/A	N/A	N/A	1212	N/A	N/A
2 <sup>nd</sup> Siren Activation		1216	N/A	N/A	1216	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2 <sup>nd</sup> EAS Message		1217	N/A	N/A	1216	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ag Protective Action Decision for PAZ 1 and 2: Hold Dairy Products, Livestock and Harvested Crops		1100	1137	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1137	N/A	N/A
EAS Message		1140	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ag Protective Action Decision for PAZ 4, 5 and 9: Shelter Dairy Animals and Livestock and Place on Stored Feed and Water; Stop Harvest of Crops		1100	1143	N/A	1207	N/A	N/A			1143		N/A
EAS Message		1146	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ag Protective Action Decision for PAZ 1, 2, 4 and 5: Ag Holds for PAZs 1, 2, 4 and 5; Shelter Dairy Animals and Livestock and place on Stored Feed and Water in PAZs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9		1204	1228	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1228	N/A	N/A
EAS Message		1230	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ag Protective Action Decision: Ag Holds for PAZs 1, 2, 4 and 5; Shelter Dairy Animals and Livestock and place on Stored Feed and Water in PAZs 1, 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9		1236	1232	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1232	N/A	N/A
EAS Message		1237	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers in PAZs 1, 2, 4 and 5; General Public in PAZs 1, 2, 4 and 5		1203	1221	1210	1213	1211	N/A	N/A	1210	1221	1207	1206

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